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THE IMPACT OF PADILLA V. KENTUCKY ON THE 
IMMIGRATION COURTS:  
DOES THE POTENTIAL FOR VACATING A CRIMINAL 








When a non-U.S. citizen is a defendant in a criminal proceeding, the 
results can have legal consequences beyond the criminal sentence.  
Essentially, if a non-U.S. citizen (including those with Lawful Permanent 
Resident “LPR” status) pleads guilty to or is found guilty of certain criminal 
offenses, he or she is subject to removal/deportation from the United States.  
Since federal and state criminal courts are separate from the immigration 
courts, many times criminal lawyers may not have been aware of the 
immigration consequences of certain types of judgments of conviction 
(“JOC”) and may not have advised such clients of the immigration 
consequences of guilty pleas or findings of guilt.  
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Recently, in Padilla v. Kentucky,1 the United States Supreme Court, as 
well as various other federal and state courts, has examined the impact of 
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) on criminal defendants who are 
not United States citizens and who may be subject to removal/deportation as 
a result of criminal convictions.  This same issue was reviewed nine months 
prior to Padilla when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided State v. 
Nuñez-Valdéz.2  However, Padilla still left many questions unanswered.  
The Second Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. Cerna analyzed whether IAC alone 
could excuse an alien’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.3  The 
State Supreme Court of Georgia tackled the unanswered question in Padilla 
of whether removal/deportation is a direct or collateral consequence of a 
criminal conviction.  Finally, the Northern District of Illinois decision in 
U.S. v. Chaidez is the only reported case to date dealing with whether 
Padilla should be applied retroactively.4 
How, and in what way, will Padilla and its progeny impact 
removal/deportation proceedings before the already burdened immigration 
courts?  This article will attempt to answer that in four parts.  The first part 
introduces the Padilla analysis and how other federal and state courts have 
further expanded different components of Padilla.  The second part 
discusses the effect Padilla’s holding may have on immigration 
proceedings.  The third part discusses whether Padilla or its state 
counterpart, State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, may be applied retroactively.  The 
article concludes with a reflection on the consequences that the immigration 
courts will likely face as a result of recent case law.   
I. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY AND ITS PROGENY 
                                                
1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010).  See generally Michael Vomacka, Current 
Developments: Judicial Branch, Supreme Court Decision in Padilla v. Kentucky States 
Affirmative Duty to Inform Client of Risk Guilty Plea May Result in Removal, 25 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 233 (2010). 
2 State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 975 A.2d 418 (N.J. 2009).  See also United States v. Gilbert, 2010 
WL 4134286 (D.N.J. 2010) (expressing an interesting dichotomy, in which a post-Padilla 
decision of the U.S. District Court in New Jersey reviewed a plea agreement in a New York 
state criminal matter and declined to apply Padilla retroactively, relying instead on the 
reasonableness of counsel at the time the plea was entered into).   
3 United States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that ineffective 
assistance of counsel can be grounds to excuse an alien’s failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies against a deportation order).   
4 United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (reasoning that since 
Padilla did not establish a new rule, no retroactivity problems exist).   
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A. The Supreme Court of the United States: Padilla v. Kentucky and the 
Direct and Collateral Consequences of Criminal Adjudication 
The Padilla court examined whether the Sixth Amendment’s protection 
against ineffective assistance of counsel applied to a criminal defense 
attorney’s misadvice regarding the immigration consequences of an alien’s 
guilty plea to an aggravated felony.  After finding that misadvice could 
theoretically affect the alien-defendant’s immigration status, the Supreme 
Court remanded the matter back to the trial court for fact-finding on the 
practical aspects, applying the first part of the Strickland two-part test. 
Under Strickland, the petitioner must show both that his counsel’s 
conduct “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”5 
Jose Padilla (“Padilla”), a legal permanent resident and a native from 
Honduras, came to the U.S. in the 1960s and served as a member of the 
U.S. Armed Forces.  In August 2002, pursuant to a plea agreement, Padilla 
pled guilty to possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, 
and marijuana trafficking.6  These crimes are all removal/deportable 
offenses under 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), thus making his deportation 
virtually inevitable.7 
Padilla maintained that prior counsel affirmatively mislead him by 
advising that Padilla’s immigration status was not in danger due to his long 
duration as a legal permanent resident of the U.S.  In August 2004, Padilla 
                                                
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 58 (1985) (holding that “the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to 
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”); see also Aparico v. 
Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (declaring that there is a strong presumption that 
counsel provided reasonable professional assistance under the first prong of the Strickland 
test).    
6 See Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at 
*2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006), rev’d, 253 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2008).   
7 See Immigration and Nationality, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2011) (declaring that 
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation 
of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 802)), other than a single offense involving possession for one's 
own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable).   
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filed for post conviction relief (“PCR”) in the criminal court alleging he 
received ineffective assistance of prior counsel when he pled guilty.  The 
Hardin Circuit Court denied Padilla’s motion, finding the guilty plea valid. 
The Court ultimately found that defendants need not be informed of all 
possible consequences resulting from a guilty plea. The Court of Appeals 
reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case holding that “an 
affirmative act of ‘gross misadvice’ relating to collateral matters can justify 
post-conviction relief.”8  
The Supreme Court of Kentucky subsequently reversed the Court of 
Appeals and reinstated the ruling by the Hardin Circuit Court. The 
Kentucky Supreme Court maintained that prior counsel’s failure to advise 
Padilla of the collateral consequences was not a basis for PCR. The U.S. 
Supreme Court disagreed with the Kentucky Supreme Court, and held that 
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel 
required criminal defense counsel to advise alien that pleading guilty to an 
aggravated felony will trigger automatic deportation. The Padilla court 
further held that if misadvice about deportation results in a misinformed 
guilty plea, then the misadvice could amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel and warrants the vacation of an alien’s guilty plea.   
Although the U.S. Supreme Court departed from the strict rule applied 
by the Kentucky Supreme Court, Padilla did not express that deportation 
was a direct consequence of a conviction due to ineffective counsel.  
Rather, the Court commented:  
Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because 
of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to 
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.  The 
collateral vs. direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a 
Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.  We 
conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically 
removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.9  
However, the Court also recognized that deportation is a “particularly 
severe ‘penalty’…intimately related to the criminal process.”10  Thus, the 
                                                
8 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483–84 (Ky. 2008).   
9 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). 
10 Id. at 1481. 
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Court determined that removal has practically become an automatic result 
for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.11  
Critically, Padilla held the two-pronged test in Strickland was 
appropriate to determine ineffective assistance of counsel.12  As Padilla 
satisfied the first-prong, the Court remanded the matter back to Kentucky 
for a factual hearing to determine whether Padilla also satisfied the fact-
dependent second prong.13 
B. The United States Court of Appeals: U.S. v. Cerna and the Post-Padilla 
Application 
In Cerna, the Second Circuit rendered the first published post-Padilla 
decision on whether ineffective assistance of immigration counsel could 
excuse an alien’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  The Court 
vacated the trial court’s order and held:  
[t]hat ineffective assistance of counsel may be grounds for 
excusing the requirement of [8 U.S.C.] § 1326(d)(1) that an alien 
in an illegal reentry case in bringing a collateral challenge to the 
prior order of deportation must have exhausted all administrative 
remedies in the prior proceeding.14  
The Cerna court did not examine a scenario similar to Nuñez-Valdéz 
and Padilla.  The facts did not pertain to a well-informed guilty plea, but 
instead focused on the conduct of the alien-attorney’s negligent failure to 
file a waiver application.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found the alien 
eligible for a waiver of admissibility under the former Immigration and 
                                                
11 See id. at 1481 (discussing the integration of criminal convictions and the penalty of 
deportation for “nearly a century” and asserting that recent changes in immigration law 
have made removal a nearly “automatic result”). 
12 See id. at 1477; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010) (applying 
the Strickland test to assess the defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel). 
13 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010).  Additionally, subsequent to the 
Padilla ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court has remanded at least two cases “for further 
consideration” in light of Padilla.  See Chapa v. United States, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5340, 130 
S.Ct. 3504 (June 28, 2010) (direct appeal from a conviction resulting from a guilty plea); 
see also Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3004, 130 S.Ct. 2340 (Apr. 5, 
2010) (appeal from a writ of coram nobis, an application to withdraw a guilty plea, which 
may be filed under limited circumstances). 
14 United States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(c).  The Padilla precedent was reflected in 
the Second Circuit’s rationale:  
For non-citizens at risk of deportation the consequences of 
inadequate counsel can be devastating, because such incompetence 
undermines the fair and effective administration of justice, courts 
must be ever vigilant. We cannot countenance the circumstance in 
which the failure of counsel to meet the most basic professional 
standards denies the alien meaningful opportunity for judicial 
review. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky [citation omitted] (“The 
importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of 
crimes has never been more important.”)15 
In May 1996, the IJ found Jose Ricardo Cerna (“Cerna”) deportable as 
charged, but also found Cerna was eligible for waiver relief under the 
former INA § 212(c).  The IJ granted counsel’s adjournment request and 
was provided forty-five days to file the required documents.   Counsel never 
filed the requisite documents, and sixteen days after the agreed-upon filing 
deadline, the IJ issued a deportation order.  The order informed the parties 
of their appeal rights and the filing period for the appeal.  The order was 
served separately on Cerna and counsel.  No appeal was filed, and Cerna 
was deported to El Salvador.  On December 13, 2000, Cerna returned to the 
U.S. without consent or permission from immigration officials.  On that 
date, Cerna was arrested, and later pled guilty to the possession of a 
controlled substance.  In July 2004, Cerna was also indicted for unlawfully 
re-entering the U.S., and he was arrested on that indictment in June 2007.  
The district court denied Cerna’s motion to dismiss the indictment on 
various grounds, yet it made no findings as to whether counsel had been 
ineffective.  Although Cerna alleged he was unlawfully deported, the 
district court stated that even assuming that counsel was “unacceptable,” 
Cerna had “knowingly and intelligently waived” his right to any 
administrative remedies as evidenced by the inaction to contest his 
deportation during the year that elapsed between the issuance of the 
deportation order and his deportation.16  
The central issue before the Second Circuit was whether ineffective 
assistance of counsel can excuse a failure to exhaust administrative 
                                                
15 Id. at 35–36. 
16 Id. at 38. 
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remedies under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1).17  In prior decisions, the Second 
Circuit held that the second and third requirements under section 1326(d) 
may be met when the alien received ineffective assistance of counsel.18  The 
Second Circuit also held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was 
excusable when the waiver of the right to administrative remedies was 
invalid.19  
C. State Supreme Courts: Smith v. State and a Post-Padilla Determination 
of Direct versus Collateral Consequences in Georgia 
About three months after Padilla, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
decided in Smith v. State that the defendant was not entitled to direct appeal 
of his convictions despite his assertion that the trial court failed to advise 
him that his guilty pleas may impact his immigration status.20  
On April 25, 2003, Lawrence Rupert Smith (“Smith”) pled guilty but 
mentally ill to several child molestation offenses.  More than five years 
later, on October 15, 2008, he filed a motion for out-of-time appeal 
asserting that the trial court violated state rules when it failed to advise him 
about the potential consequences his guilty pleas would have on his 
immigration status.  The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of 
                                                
17 Id. at 42.  Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), a criminal alien may not challenge the validity of a 
deportation order made against him unless the alien can show that (1) he exhausted all 
available administrative remedies, (2) the deportation proceedings improperly deprived the 
alien of the opportunity for judicial review, and (3) the entry of the deportation order was 
fundamentally unfair. The opinion focuses primarily on the first prong as the court held 
that the determinations on the second and third prongs were based on the erroneous 
conclusion of the first prong.  See Immigration and Nationality, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2011). 
18 See United States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 42 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that ineffective 
assistance of counsel can be grounds for excusing the administrative exhaustion 
requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1)); see also United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97, 101 
(2d Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant satisfied the exhaustion requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 
1326(d) even though he did not file a § 212(c) waiver because of the ineffective assistance 
of his lawyer); see also Spaulding v. Mayorkas, 725 F. Supp. 2d 303, 309 (D. Conn. 2010) 
(recognizing that the Second Circuit, under certain circumstances, has been willing to 
overlook exhaustion requirements in situations involving ineffective assistance of counsel). 
19 United States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 42 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Sosa, 387 
F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2004)) (stating that it would be contradictory to admit that attorney 
incompetence can deprive an alien of judicial review, but disallow the incompetence to 
excuse the alien’s failure to seek review); see United States v. Calderon, 391 F.3d 370, 
371–72 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a defendant can be excused from the administrative 
exhaustion requirement when his waiver of administrative remedies was unknowing). 
20 Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177, 180–81 (Ga. 2010). 
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Appeals affirmed, holding that “the effect of a guilty plea on a resident 
alien’s immigration status is a ‘collateral consequence’ of the plea, and a 
guilty plea will not be set aside because [Smith] was not advised of such a 
possible collateral consequence.”21  
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court analyzed the effect of the 
Padilla holding, which was decided after the Court of Appeals rendered 
their decision.  The Georgia Supreme Court did not challenge that 
deportation is “intimately related to the criminal process” and that the 
consequences of deportation based on a guilty plea would be of tremendous 
concern to a defendant.22  However, the Georgia Supreme Court made the 
point that such consequences were beyond the sentencing court, as were 
other consequences that are of concern to defendants, such as parole 
eligibility and related criminal or civil proceedings.  The Georgia Supreme 
Court hesitated to apply the direct consequence doctrine to immigration 
issues out of concern of the unrealistic burden that would be placed on 
sentencing courts to determine all potential consequences of a guilty plea to 
a particular defendant.23 
The Georgia Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court 
specifically declined to rely on the direct versus collateral consequences 
doctrine and alternatively applied Strickland’s two-pronged test to 
determine whether a defendant had a claim for ineffective assistance.24  The 
Georgia Supreme Court found that, absent a binding directive from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Georgia Supreme Court would also decline to apply the 
direct consequences doctrine to the issue of whether an alien received 
ineffective assistance and concluded that the Court of Appeals did not err in 
finding that negative immigration findings are collateral consequences of a 
guilty plea.25 
                                                
21 Smith v. State, 680 S.E.2d 516, 517 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
22 Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177, 184 (Ga. 2010) (stating that even though a guilty plea 
could result in deportation, that fact is beyond the authority of the court to consider). 
23 Id. (explaining that it is unclear where the line would be drawn if the direct consequence 
doctrine was extended). 
24 Id. at 182–83 (stating that the proper analysis is whether the attorney acted reasonably 
and in accordance with professional norms). 
25 Id. at 184 (explaining that the Court did not extend the direct consequences doctrine 
despite its discussion of the risks of deportation). 
Spring 2011] THE IMPACT OF PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 55 
ON IMMIGRATION COURTS 
D. State v. Nuñez-Valdéz and New Jersey’s Interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court decided State v. Nunez-Valdez in July 2009.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that an alien’s guilty plea was invalid because 
he was not informed that his guilty plea would result in deportation.26  In 
June 1997, Jose Nuñez-Valdéz (“Nuñez-Valdéz”) pled guilty to fourth-
degree criminal sexual contact in exchange for a probationary sentence of 
five years.  As a result of conviction, Nuñez-Valdéz was ordered removed 
by the Immigration Court in September 2000.27  
In August 2002, the BIA affirmed the removal order and Nuñez-Valdéz 
was removed from the U.S.  In October 2002, Nuñez-Valdéz filed a PCR 
petition asserting that defense counsel misinformed him about the 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.  Defense counsel told him 
there were no immigration consequences.  At the PCR hearings in June 
2002, Nuñez-Valdéz testified that when he was charged with sexual assault 
in 1998, he retained counsel Aaron Smith (“Counsel Smith”).  When 
Counsel Smith, through an interpreter, told Nuñez-Valdéz to plead guilty in 
exchange for a five-year probationary sentence, Nuñez-Valdéz inquired 
about the immigration consequences.  Counsel Smith responded that 
“nothing like that” would result.28  At the plea hearing, new counsel, Troy 
A. Archie (“Counsel Archie”) informed Nuñez-Valdéz that if he did not 
plead guilty then he would go to jail for ten years.  Nuñez-Valdéz, again, 
through an interpreter, raised the issue of his immigration status with 
Counsel Archie.  Counsel Archie informed Nuñez-Valdéz that his 
immigration status had “no part in this case.”29 
Nuñez-Valdéz further testified that neither counsel nor the interpreter 
reviewed the plea form with him.  He was unaware that Question 17 on the 
plea form stated that a non-citizen defendant may be deported based on a 
                                                
26 State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 975 A.2d 418, 419 (N.J. 2009) (holding that there was sufficient 
evidence to suggest that if defendant had received complete information, he would not have 
entered a guilty plea). 
27 Id. at 419 (stating that defendant was deported to the Dominican Republic as a result of 
his guilty plea and subsequent conviction). 
28 Id. at 420, 430. 
29 Id. at 420. 
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guilty plea or criminal conviction of an aggravated felony.30  In New Jersey, 
Nuñez-Valdéz’s statement about the plea form is significant.  Perhaps as 
early as 2002, the standard criminal plea form used in New Jersey superior 
courts contained a question on the immigration consequences of guilty 
pleas.  Generally, the New Jersey court rules require that the first PCR 
petition must be brought within five years of the conviction.31  However, 
the PCR petition may be brought beyond the five-year period if the 
defendant showed excusable neglect and there is reasonable probability that 
if the defendant’s factual assertions were found to be true, then enforcing 
the time bar would result in fundamental injustice.32  The court rules also 
provide a one-year filing deadline for a second or subsequent PCR petitions 
under certain circumstances.33 
At the PCR hearings Nuñez-Valdéz maintained his innocence, asserting 
that he would not have pled guilty to sexual assault were he aware of the 
immigration consequences.  His sworn statements were false because 
counsel pressured him.  Counsel Archie testified that he did not inform 
Nuñez-Valdéz of deportation if Nuñez-Valdéz pled guilty.  The trial court 
found Nuñez-Valdéz’s testimony to be credible and Nuñez-Valdéz had 
reasonable belief that his guilty plea would not result in deportation based 
on counsel’s legal advice.  The trial court noted Nuñez-Valdéz’s primary 
concern was on deportation and considered his lack of education and 
sophistication when determining his credibility.34 
The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s findings on 
“the lack of factual foundation.”35  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the trial court’s findings that Nuñez-Valdéz received ineffective 
assistance of counsel when defense counsel informed him that his guilty 
plea would not affect his immigration status.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that but for counsel’s ineffective assistance, Nuñez-Valdéz 
would not have pled guilty, and defense counsel’s ineffective assistance and 
                                                
30 Id. at 420 (noting that Defendant claimed to be unaware of question seventeen on the 
plea form and the risk of deportation associated with pleading guilty).   
31 See N.J. CT. R. 3:22-12(a)(1), -12(c) (2011). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 3:22-12(a)(2). 
34 See State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 975 A.2d 418, 421–22 (N.J. 2009). 
35 Id. at 422 (quoting State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 2008 WL 2743963, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. July 16, 2008)). 
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misleading material information resulted in Nuñez-Valdéz’s misinformed 
guilty plea.  The case was remanded to the trial court.36 
Similarly to Padilla, Nuñez-Valdéz did not express that the immigration 
consequences were a direct result of ineffective counsel.  Generally, the 
“established formulation” with regard to the penal (or direct) versus 
collateral consequences was that the defendant needed only to be informed 
of the penal consequences of a plea.37  However, Nuñez-Valdéz discarded 
this notion by opining, “whether a defendant should be advised of ‘certain 
consequences of a guilty plea should not depend on ill-defined and 
irrelevant characterizations of those consequences.’”38   
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
There is an attenuated relationship between a criminal conviction and 
the immigration consequences.  The conditions and factors affecting the 
relationship include: (1) the criminal court must grant the PCR petition 
pursuant to court rules and procedures (considering whether Padilla has 
retroactive applications on convictions, and in New Jersey, whether Nuñez-
Valdéz can be applied retroactively); (2) the evidence must demonstrate 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland v. Washington39 two-
prong test, and relevant case law; (3) the alien’s guilty plea must be 
rescinded/set aside; (4) the indictment/charging document must be dropped; 
(5) the alien’s conviction must be vacated based on the merits of the charge 
or on a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings; and (6) the 
Immigration Courts must find that the alien was not convicted for 
immigration purposes or that the conviction was not modified solely for 
immigration purposes. 
                                                
36 Id. at 427. 
37 See State v. Heitzman, 527 A.2d 439, 440 (N.J. 1987) (holding that the court does not 
have a duty to inform defendant of possible collateral consequences of his plea, such as the 
loss of public employment or impact on immigration status). 
38 State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 975 A.2d 418, 423 (N.J. 2009) (quoting State v. Bellamy, 835 
A.2d 1231, 1237 (N.J. 2003)). 
39 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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A. Pending Motions/Petitions for PCR Based on a Collateral Consequence 
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Does Not Effect 
Removal/Deportation Hearings 
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA states that a conviction does not 
become final for immigration purposes until direct appellate review has 
been exhausted or waived.  The Third Circuit, in deciding whether an IJ’s 
order of removal was proper while an alien’s petitions for writ of error 
coram nobis were pending, specifically held: 
[that] pendency of post-conviction motions or other forms of 
collateral attack . . . . does not vitiate finality [of convictions for 
immigration removal purposes], unless and until the convictions 
are overturned as a result of the collateral motions.40 
The Paredes court noted the alien’s time for direct appeal had expired 
and that a writ of error coram nobis was not a direct appeal of, but rather is 
a collateral attack on, a conviction.41  
B. Requests for Adjournments and Motions for Continuance 
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, the IJ may grant a motion for a continuance 
for good cause shown.42  In determining whether good cause exists to 
continue such proceedings, a variety of factors include an opposing 
response for the request; the alien’s statutory eligibility for relief; if the 
relief is based on discretionary grounds; and other relevant procedural 
factors.43  The IJ may grant a “reasonable adjournment” either at his or her 
                                                
40 Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 
Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2004) (relying on the same premise). 
41 Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming that a writ of error 
coram nobis constitutes a collateral attack on a conviction and can be differentiated from a 
direct appeal.) 
42 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2011); see also Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 788 (BIA 
2009), rev’d, 531 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Matter of Rajah, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 
129–30 (BIA 2009), aff’d, Rajah v. Holder, No. 09-5146-AG, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 159 
(2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2011); see also Matter of Perez-Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 433, 434 (BIA 
1987).  
43 See Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 790–91 (BIA 2009), rev’d, 531 F.3d 256 (3d 
Cir. 2009); see also Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
a “continuance for good cause” requires a reason consistent with the given statute). 
Spring 2011] THE IMPACT OF PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 59 
ON IMMIGRATION COURTS 
own instance or for “good cause shown” by the alien.44  Yet, such requests 
should not be denied solely for an agency’s case completion goals.45 
As it is within the IJ’s sound discretion, “[t]he alien at least must make a 
reasonable showing that the lack of preparation occurred despite a diligent 
good faith effort to be ready to proceed and that any additional evidence he 
seeks to present is probative, noncumulative, and significantly favorable to 
the alien.”46  The IJ must execute his or her duty to determine whether the 
requisite evidence sustains a charge of removability/deportation in an 
expeditious manner.47  
Furthermore, an IJ’s denial of a motion for a continuance will not be 
overturned on appeal unless the alien demonstrates that the denial deprived 
him of his due process right to a full and fair hearing.48  Specifically, the 
alien must show that the denial resulted in actual prejudice that materially 
affected the outcome of the case.49  Generally, an IJ is not required to 
suspend removal proceedings based upon the mere possibility that a 
collateral criminal proceeding could have a future impact on the alien's 
immigration status.  An alien’s conviction and his collateral attack upon that 
conviction does not negate its validity until it is in fact overturned or 
materially amended.50  
C. Conviction for Immigration Purposes 
Generally, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) gives full faith 
and credit to state court actions that purport to vacate a non-citizen’s 
                                                
44 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6 (2011). 
45 See Hashmi v. Att’y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2009).  
46 See Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. 354, 356 (BIA 1983). 
47 See Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982); see also Matthew R. Hall, 
Procedural Due Process Meets National Security: The Problem of Classified Evidence in 
Immigration Proceedings, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 515, 526–27 (2002) (discussing an 
understanding that immigration judges are to use their discretion in a way that promotes 
fair and expeditious trials). 
48 See Matter of Luviano-Rodriguez, 21 I&N Dec. 235, 237 (BIA 1996) (citing Matter of 
Perez-Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 433 (BIA 1987)).  
49 See Matter of Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. 354, 356–57 (BIA 1983).  
50 See Matter of Madrigal-Calvo, 21 I&N Dec. 323, 327 (BIA 1996). 
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criminal conviction.51  On the other hand, “[i]f a court vacates an alien’s 
criminal conviction solely on the basis of immigration hardships or 
rehabilitation, rather than on the basis of a substantive or procedural defect 
in the underlying criminal proceedings, the conviction is not eliminated for 
immigration purposes and will continue to serve as a valid factual predicate 
for a charge of removability despite its vacatur.”52  
Although Padilla held that counsel’s failure to advise an alien of the 
immigration consequences when pleading guilty constituted ineffective 
counsel, it is not within the Immigration Court’s authority to determine 
whether alien’s counsel provided ineffective assistance in a criminal 
proceeding.53  In a pre-Nuñez-Valdéz and pre-Padilla framework, the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not disturb the BIA’s statutory 
interpretation.54 
D. Practical Implications? 
Adjournment requests and motions for continuance asserted under 
Padilla or Nuñez-Valdéz should be carefully considered.  Unless proven 
otherwise, PCR petitions are generally speculative and premised on 
                                                
51 See Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N Dec. 1378, 1380 (BIA 2000); see also Matter of 
Chavez-Martinez, 24 I&N Dec. 272, 273 (BIA 2007) (asserting that as a general rule, the 
BIA gives “full faith and credit to State court actions that purport to vacate an alien's 
criminal conviction”).  
52 Matter of Chavez-Martinez, 24 I&N Dec. 272, 273 (BIA 2007); see Matter of Pickering, 
23 I&N Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003) (interpreting “conviction” under INA § 101(a)(48)(A)); 
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2011) (stating that 
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment 
of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been 
withheld, where (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien 
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient 
facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some 
form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be 
imposed).  
53 See Matter of Roberts, 20 I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991) (finding that it is well-settled that 
neither the BIA nor the IJ is permitted to look behind the conviction record and re-litigate 
the ultimate question on the alien’s guilt or innocence). 
54 See Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 206–08 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Matter of Pickering, 
23 I&N Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003)); see also Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 245 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (upholding the BIA’s distinction in Matter of Pickering and finding the 
distinction to be a reasonable interpretation of the statute).  See generally Matter of Roldan-
Santoyo, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1999). 
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attenuated conditions.  As discussed above, convictions based on guilty 
pleas are final for immigration purposes.55  For immigration purposes, it 
does not matter if the alien criminal defendant pled guilty at, or is found 
guilty after, a trial in order for immigration consequences to be triggered. 
 The probability that a PCR petition will overturn a conviction for 
immigration purposes is speculative.  As expressed earlier, the probability is 
contingent on non-exhaustive conditions and factors: (1) the criminal court 
must grant the PCR petition pursuant to the court rules and procedures 
(considering retroactivity in Padilla, and in New Jersey, the retroactivity in 
Nuñez-Valdéz); (2) evidence must demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland’s two-prong test and relevant case law; (3) the 
alien’s guilty plea must be set aside; (4) the indictment/charging document 
must be dropped; (5) the alien’s conviction must be vacated; and (6) the 
Immigration Court’s must find that the alien was not convicted for 
immigration purposes, nor the conviction modified for immigration 
purposes. 
Assuming these non-exhaustive conditions and factors are met, the alien 
can file a motion to reopen with the Immigration Court.  If the Immigration 
Court grants the motion to reopen, then the alien will be provided the 
opportunity to present his or her forms of relief.   
III. RETROACTIVITY 
A. Generally 
The Supreme Court of the United States has previously held that 
convicted criminal defendants are generally unable to take advantage of any 
new rules that are decided after a conviction becomes final.56  The Supreme 
                                                
55 On the specific issue of a continuance based on a pending PCR motion, see Cabral v. 
Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 890 (5th Cir. 2011) (The Circuit Court held that the BIA did not 
abuse its discretion in declining to hold immigration proceedings in abeyance while alien 
pursued a post-conviction relief motion to vacate New York state criminal convictions). 
This matter was not premised on a claim of ineffective counsel and does not analyze 
Padilla.  See also Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Matter of 
Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546, 551 (BIA 1988) (stating that one of the elements necessary for 
an immigration conviction is that “a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has 
entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a 
finding of guilty”). 
56 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (2011) 
(noting that the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing a failed claim unless the claim 
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Court declares a new rule “when it breaks new ground or imposes a new 
obligation on the States or the Federal Government . . . . To put it 
differently, . . . . if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the 
time the defendant's conviction became final.”57 
However, not all Supreme Court decisions create new rules of law.  
Rather, the Court may merely be applying an existing rule to a new set of 
facts.  If that is the case, then a new rule is not created and a criminal 
defendant is free to use the decision when seeking post-conviction relief in 
the form of a collateral attack. 
B. Retroactive Application of Padilla 
It is significant to point out that the discussed cases do not explicitly 
mandate retroactive application and do not expressly categorize 
removal/deportation consequences as a direct consequence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.58  Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not express 
retroactive application to collateral attacks on guilty pleas entered prior to 
Padilla, the Court’s inference appears to be against retroactivity, except in 
exceptional circumstances: 
It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant 
effect on those convictions already obtained as a result of plea 
bargains. For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have 
generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on 
deportation consequences of a client’s guilty plea. We should, 
therefore, presume that counsel satisfied their obligation to render 
competent advice at the time their clients considered pleading 
guilty.59 
The Padilla court anticipated that its decision would prompt new or 
subsequent filings of PCR petitions asserting ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Nevertheless, retroactivity is not automatic; rather, it is the 
                                                                                                                       
relies on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court). 
57 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (emphasis in original) (internal citations 
omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i) (2011) (noting that the applicant may receive an 
evidentiary hearing if the rule was previously unavailable and applies retroactively to cases 
on collateral review). 
58 But see United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, (N.D. Ill. 2010).  
59 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). 
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exception and not the rule.  Generally, the Supreme Court assumes non-
retroactivity of its holdings when raised on collateral review.60  However, 
Padilla may fall within an exception to non-retroactivity since it “requires 
the observance of ‘those procedures that . . . . are ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’’”61 
The U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of California recently 
addressed the issue of Padilla’s retroactive application in United States v. 
Hubenig.62  The Hubenig court began its analysis by reviewing the holding 
in Teague v. Lane: 
Teague’s general principle is that “new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which 
have become final before the new rules are announced.”63  
The Hubenig court determined that the Supreme Court did not declare a 
new rule for the purposes of Teague.  Further, the Hubenig court stated that 
the Padilla holding would apply retroactively based on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s “floodgates” analysis.64  Specifically, the court stated: 
The [U.S. Supreme] Court stated that it had “given serious 
consideration” to the argument that its ruling would open the 
“floodgates” to new litigation challenging prior guilty pleas.  The 
Court minimized the “floodgates” concern by stating that a 
petitioner would have to show not only that his counsel's 
                                                
60 See generally Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216 (1988).  See also Tyler v. Cain, 533 
U.S. 656, 665 (2001) (stating that retroactivity is not applicable unless it falls within two 
narrow exceptions). 
61 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325 (1937)); see also MASS. COMM. FOR PUB. COUNS. SERVS., PRACTICE ADVISORY ON 
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 4–5 (2010), http://www.publiccounsel.net/Practice_Areas/immi 
gration/pdf/Padilla%20v.%20Kentucky%20-%20CPCS%20advisory%204-8-10.pdf. 
62 See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-MJ-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 
July 1, 2010).  
63 Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)); see also People v. Valestil, No. 
2007KN010757, 2010 WL 2367351, at *3–4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. June 14, 2010) (rationalizing 
that Padilla could be utilized since the decision did not set a new constitutional rule). 
64 See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-MJ-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 
July 1, 2010).  
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performance fell below professional standards, but also that he 
was prejudiced by the deficient performance.65  
The court opined that the U.S. Supreme Court would not have discussed 
the “floodgates” issue had they intended Padilla to be applied only 
prospectively.66  As a result, the Hubenig court ultimately granted the 
petitioner’s writ of error coram nobis and vacated his convictions, which 
were finalized nearly seven years before Padilla was decided. 
In U.S. v. Chaidez, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois reviewed a petition for writ of error coram nobis and addressed the 
issue of whether Padilla should be applied retroactively.67  The Chaidez 
court explained that “Padilla could be described as establishing a per se 
rule that counsel must inform a client of immigration consequences before 
an informed guilty plea may be entered.68  Alternatively, the case can be 
read as a straightforward application of Strickland: the petitioner's attorney 
‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ because, as a factual 
matter, the professional standards at the time of the client's plea required 
counsel to inform of potential immigration consequences.”69 
Ultimately, the Northern District of Illinois Court held that Padilla may 
be applied retroactively.  That conclusion is based generally on the court’s 
finding that the rule that came out of the Padilla decision, i.e., that a 
Strickland IAC claim lies in situations where counsel fails to inform a client 
of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, is not considered 
                                                
65 Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484–85 
(2010)). 
66 Id.  
67 See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 896, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding 
that Padilla could be applied retroactively and thus does not pose a problem to petitioner’s 
claim).  But see United States v. Bacchus, No. 93-083S, 2010 WL 5571730, at *1 (D.R.I. 
Dec. 8, 2010) (deciding that Padilla cannot be applied retroactively to a final conviction 
which was not before under collateral attack); see United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 
2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010) (stating that Padilla produced a new rule 
that does not apply retroactively); see also Haddad v. United States, No. 07-12540, 2010 
WL 2884645, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2010) (finding that it would be unlikely that 
Padilla will be applied retroactively). 
68 United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (explaining that 
Padilla can be interpreted to require criminal defense counsel to inform clients of possible 
immigration repercussions by pleading guilty).   
69 Id. at 901.  
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a “new rule” for postconviction retroactivity purposes because it addresses 
an obligation that existed at the time of the original plea.  
The Court based this conclusion on two grounds: first, that the Supreme 
Court itself decided the Padilla matter on its merits rather than on 
retroactivity procedural grounds which it could very well have done; and 
second, that Padilla was really an extension of Strickland that highlighted 
the importance of counsel informing a client of immigration consequences 
from a criminal conviction, a practice  that has long been advocated by the 
ABA and other bar associations.70 
Due to the recentness of Padilla, the federal circuit courts of appeal 
have yet to issue a decision on this matter.  To date, there is one reported 
federal district court decision on this issue.  That decision, U.S. v. Chaidez, 
favors retroactivity.71  For now, state courts differ on whether to apply 
Padilla retroactively, though a trend toward retroactive application is 
developing, at least in New Jersey and New York.72  
                                                
70 See id. at 902–04.  
71  See generally id. 902–03 (concluding Padilla should be applied retroactively based on 
two reasons: 1) the criminal defendant brought a collateral challenge to his conviction and 
2) “[a] post-conviction court applying Strickland is bound to consider whether counsel’s 
assistance was effective with reference to professional standards as they existed at the time 
of the conviction” (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)).  But see United States 
v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010) (positing that it 
is unclear as to whether Padilla is retroactive); see United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, 
No. 1:10cv618, 2010 WL 2400006, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010) (stating that “nothing in 
the Padilla decision addresses whether it is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 
review”); see Gacko v. United States, No. 09-CV-4938, 2010 WL 2076020, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010) (holding that Padilla has no retroactive effect). 
72 Compare People v. Nuñez, 2010 WL 5186602, at *2 (N.Y. App. Term Dec. 15, 2010) 
(favoring retroactive application of rule), People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404–05 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (same), People v. Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 837 n.2 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 2010) (same), and People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (“if 
the Supreme Court did not intend for Padilla to be retroactively applied, that would render 
meaningless the majority’s lengthy discussion about concerns that Padilla would open the 
‘floodgates’ of challenges to guilty pleas”), with People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 890 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (Padilla is not to be retroactively applied). 
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C. Retroactive Application of Nuñez-Valdéz73 
In New Jersey, the question on whether there is retroactivity involves 
multiple levels of analyses.  The threshold inquiry is if there is a “new rule 
of law.”74  If a ruling does not involve a “departure from existing law,” then 
retroactivity analysis is not required.75  
In a case where a decision involves an accepted legal principle, then a 
new rule exists when “the decision’s application of [the] general principle is 
‘sufficiently novel and unanticipated.’”76  In other words, there must be a 
“sudden and generally unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing 
practice.”77  On the other hand, a new rule of law is not subject to automatic 
retroactive application since it may be disruptive and upset long-accepted 
conventions and widely used practices.  This may lead to confusion and 
disorder to the criminal justice system.78 
                                                
73 To date, there are no reported cases addressing the retroactive application of Nuñez-
Valdéz.  There are three unreported cases.  See State v. Delgado, No. A-3276-08T4, 2010 
WL 4642989, at *5–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2010) (specifically allowing 
retroactive application, reversing the trial court’s denial of the PCR motion and remanding 
the matter to trial court for a factual hearing on whether the criminal defendant was 
adequately advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea); see also State v. 
Duroseau, No. 07-05-0796, 2010 WL 4608249, at *4–5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 16, 
2010) (finding that defendant’s appeal was pending when Padilla and Nuñez-Valdéz were 
decided, and therefore choosing not to address retroactivity but to remand the case to trial 
court to hear defendant’s claims pursuant to Padilla and Nuñez-Valdéz); see also State v. 
Ambroise, No. 07-01-00007-SGJ, 2010 WL 841170, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 
11, 2010) (applying “pipeline retroactivity” to an IAC claim since the Ambroise appeal of 
the PCR motion denial was pending at the time Nuñez-Valdéz opinion was issued). 
74 State v. Dock, 2011 WL 781035, at *7–8 (N.J. Mar. 8, 2011) (reasoning that the first step 
in analyzing whether a rule should be applied retroactivity is whether there is a “new rule 
of law”); see also State v. Burstein, 427 A.2d 525, 529−30 (N.J. 1981) (discussing the 
standard for retroactivity analysis and finding that the first step is deciding whether the 
court announced the new law).  
75 State v. Burstein, 427 A.2d 525, 529−30 (N.J. 1981); see also State v. Chirokovskcic, 
860 A.2d 986, 989 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (emphasizing that retroactivity only 
becomes an issue if a new law is established). 
76 See State v. Cummings, 875 A.2d 906, 914 (N.J. 2005) (quoting State v. Knight, 678 
A.2d 642, 651 (N.J. 1996)). 
77 State v. Purnell, 735 A.2d 513, 517−18 (N.J. 1999) (quoting State v. Afanador, 697 A.2d 
529, 537 (N.J. 1997)).  
78 See State v. J.A., 942 A.2d 149, 155 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. 
Burstein, 427 A.2d 525, 532 (N.J. 1981)) (describing the disruption that may result from 
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As noted above, the first PCR motion should be brought within five 
years of the date of the conviction; however, N.J. Court Rules state that a 
second or subsequent PCR petition shall not be filed more than one year 
after the latest of: 
(A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey, if that right has been newly recognized by 
either of those Courts and made retroactive by either of those 
Courts to cases on collateral review; or 
(B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief sought 
was discovered, if that factual predicate could not have been 
discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or 
(C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent application for 
post-conviction relief where ineffective assistance of counsel that 
represented the defendant on the first or subsequent application for 
post-conviction relief is being alleged.79 
Thus, complete retroactivity should be granted when constitutional 
implications are raised, especially when the new rule is meant to 
“‘overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its 
truth-finding function’ and [sic] raises ‘serious question [sic] about the 
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials.’”80  Put differently, complete 
retroactivity is proper where the issue strikes “at the heart of the truth-
seeking function.”81 
Critically, in the recent case of State v. Gaitan, the New Jersey 
Appellate Division held that Nuñez-Valdéz should be applied retroactively 
as the decision did not establish a new rule.82  The State primarily argued 
that Nuñez-Valdéz applied only when counsel rendered incorrect advice, as 
opposed to when counsel remained silent regarding the immigration 
                                                                                                                       
applying new laws retroactivity); see also State v. Chirokovskcic, 860 A.2d 986, 989 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
79 N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12(a)(2) (2011). 
80 State v. Feal, 944 A.2d 599, 608–09 (N.J. 2008) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. 
Burstein, 427 A.2d 525, 531 (N.J. 1981)). 
81 Id. at 607–08. 
82 State v. Gaitan, 2011 WL 350505, at *2–3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 7, 2011). 
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consequences of a guilty plea.83  The State further argued that this “no 
advice” scenario constituted a new rule that should only be applied 
prospectively.84  The court in Gaitan rejected the State’s argument and 
reiterated the analysis in Padilla: 
[a] holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite two 
absurd results.  First, it would give counsel an incentive to remain 
silent on matters of great importance, even when answers are 
readily available.  Silence under these circumstances would be 
fundamen-tally [sic] at odds with the critical obligation of counsel 
to advise the client of “the advantages and disadvantages of a plea 
agreement.”  When attorneys know that their clients face possible 
exile from this country and separation from their families, they 
should not be encouraged to say nothing at all.  Second, it would 
deny a class of clients least able to represent themselves the most 
rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily 
available.  It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her 
client with available advice about an issue like deportation and the 
failure to do so “clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland 
analysis.”85 
Furthermore the Gaitan court addressed the State’s argument that 
Nuñez-Valdéz’s rejection of the direct versus collateral methodology 
constituted a new rule.  The court agreed that the rule would be considered 
“new” in state court proceedings, but that “the rejection of the 
direct/collateral methodology [was] not a new federal concept.”86  The court 
held that Padilla had also rejected the direct/collateral argument as the 
distinction was not necessary “to define the scope of constitutionally 
‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland.”87  
CONCLUSION 
It is still premature to predict the number of possible claims that may 
arise post-Padilla and post-Nunez.  While Padilla recognized that 
deportation is an extreme penalty and that noncitizens have a constitutional 
                                                
83 Id. at *3. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1484 
(2010)). 
86 Id. at *4. 
87 Id. at *3. 
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right to legal advice about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, 
there are still many unanswered questions that will complicate and delay 
future proceedings before an already burdened immigration court.  
Nevertheless, in light of the case law developing post-Padilla and post-
Nunez, it is likely that an alien can successfully terminate 
removal/deportation proceedings if his vacatur in criminal court as a result 
of such PCR is due to a constitutional defect in his prior representation.  As 
for those JOCs handed down prior to Padilla/Nunez, whether or not Padilla 
or Nunez can be applied retroactively is still up in the air, though it seems 
likely that courts will follow the Chaidez analysis and favor retroactivity.  
Consequently, Immigration Courts will likely see an increase in the 
number of adjournment requests by aliens in removal/deportation 
proceedings, pro se, or with counsel, who have filed or will be filing 
petitions for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) before the criminal courts that 
issued the original JOCs.  The filing of a PCR petition in a criminal court 
does not stay removal/deportation.  The Immigration Courts will treat a 
JOC as a final judgment unless and until it is vacated for a non-immigration 
purpose by the originating criminal court. 
Since PCR petitions may be filed in criminal courts, it is anticipated that 
aliens placed into removal/deportation proceedings may seek to continue 
their cases, pending the resolution of their PCR petitions.  As these aliens 
also include those detained by immigration officials, the Immigration 
Courts must address requests to continue the immigration proceedings 
pending any such PCR petitions or the pursuit of such relief. 
Concerning the validity of a subject conviction, the fact (or speculation) 
that an alien may be pursuing PCR in the form of a collateral attack (for 
immigration purposes) on a conviction in state criminal court does not 
affect the conviction’s finality for federal immigration purposes.88  Absent 
proof of actual vacatur of the criminal conviction, there is no change in the 
                                                
88 Matter of Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894, 895–96 (BIA 1994) (explaining that a conviction 
subject to collateral attack is still considered final for immigration purposes); see Matter of 
Adetiba, 20 I&N Dec. 506, 508 (BIA 1992) (holding that it is well-established that when 
appellate review of a conviction has been exhausted, the conviction is final for immigration 
purposes). 
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finality of the conviction for immigration purposes.  The conviction is final, 
unless and until it is overturned by the criminal court.89 
                                                
89 See Matter of Morel, 2010 WL 4822993 (BIA 2010) (denying respondents motion to 
reconsider a decision finding him removable based on a felony conviction since a 
conviction is final for deportation purposes); see also Matter of Ponce de Leon-Ruiz, 21 
I&N Dec. 154, 156–57 (BIA 1996) (stating that it is well established that for deportation 
purposes, a conviction is final unless it is overturned). 
